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An Auction-Based Mechanism for
Cooperative Sensing in Cognitive Networks
Qiong Shi, Cristina Comaniciu and Katia Jaffrès-Runser
Abstract—In this paper, we propose an auction-based cooper-
ative sensing protocol for secondary users in cognitive networks.
The proposed auction mechanism is based on a novel modified
Vickrey auction with a three dimensional bid, that accounts for
detection gains as well as for virtual currency gains. We present
a formal proof to show that the proposed three dimensional
bidding mechanism preserves the truthfulness property of the
classic Vickrey auction. The cooperative auction is combined
with a prioritized access scheme to increase the efficiency and to
reduce the response time for the coalition formation procedure.
Our auction-based cooperative sensing mechanism can be easily
applied to different network scenarios, by defining specific
utility functions. The proposed cooperative sensing auctioning
mechanism is illustrated for both downlink and uplink. Our
simulation results show that users’ cooperation is incentivized
by the proposed algorithm, which leads to significant detection
gains for the downlink and the uplink scenarios, with a more
efficient energy expenditure.
Index Terms—Cooperative spectrum sensing, Vickrey auction,
prioritized access, cognitive networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE problem of coexistence between primary and sec-ondary users in a cognitive radio (CR) network has been
extensively studied in the literature. Secondary users (SUs)
are allowed to utilize unused spectrum holes but have very
stringent requirements on the level of interferences that they
could create to primary users (PUs). To this extent, they are
required to sense the spectrum with high accuracy to determine
if there is no ongoing primary communication that they would
potentially disturb.
Providing Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees for the pri-
mary network and efficient communications for the secondary
network is very often addressed in the literature by proposing
intelligent spectrum management algorithms. In particular we
distinguish several research topics that address various aspects
of efficient spectrum management for the secondary-primary
users’ coexistence ([1], [2]):
1) Spectrum sensing allows CR networks to determine the
availability of spectrum resources ([3], [4], [5]);
2) Spectrum selection implements mechanisms for CR
users to select the best channels among all the available
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spectrum bands, based on their QoS requirements as
well as on the characteristics of the spectrum ([6], [7]);
3) Spectrum sharing coordinates the primary network and
the CR network, or several CR networks to share the
spectrum in an efficient way ([8], [9]);
4) Spectrum mobility allocates spectrum for dynamic
variations in spectrum availability ([10]).
In this paper, we study the problem of spectrum sensing
for detecting the presence of a PU for both the uplink
and the downlink case, in the context of incentivizing SUs’
cooperation for efficient energy management. From a practical
perspective, there are several challenges for this spectrum
sensing problem, including hardware constraints, the hidden
PU problem, the receiver uncertainty problem, difficulties
in detecting spread spectrum signals, difficulties in setting
optimal sensing parameters and various security issues ([3]).
In this paper we address some of these challenges by
proposing a cooperative sensing scheme. Cooperative sensing
has been shown to be successful in alleviating the hidden PU
problem by exploiting multi-user diversity gains ([12], [13]).
Moreover, cooperative sensing has been shown to improve
significantly the detection of a weak signal with a low SNR
([12]).
We note that the hidden PU problem in CR networks is
different from the classic hidden terminal problem in the
carrier sense multiple access (CSMA). In CSMA, a hidden
terminal problem occurs when two nodes that cannot hear
each other transmit simultaneously and they are received at a
given receiver who is in the transmission range of both nodes
([14]). As opposed to this situation, a hidden PU problem for
spectrum sensing occurs when the PU’s signal is shadowed
or in a severe multipath fading at a SU and so this SU
cannot sense the presence of the PU ([12], [15]). If then the
primary receiver is in the transmission range of the SU, this SU
will cause interference to the primary communication. In CR
networks, the receiver’s uncertainty problem is similar to the
hidden terminal problem in CSMA ([16]) and the cooperative
sensing is very effective in addressing this problem ([17]).
Fig. 1 illustrates the hidden PU problem and the receiver
uncertainty problem for spectrum sensing. It can be seen that
the cooperation between SU1 and SU2 enables the detection
of a PU, which would not be detected by SU1 independently.
The cooperative detection comes of course at a price, and
several aspects have been mentioned in the literature, such as
detection delay, requirements of a multi-user coordination al-
gorithm as well as control channel support, problems related to
asynchronous sensing, cooperation overhead, additional power
consumption for spectrum sharing, and increased complexity
Fig. 1. Illustration of hidden PU problem and receiver uncertainty problem.
([3], [18]).
In this paper, we focus on designing a good cooperation
strategy that aims to increase SUs’ detection capabilities, while
addressing some challenges mentioned above. Our solution is
to propose a cooperation formation mechanism based on an
auctioning strategy and prioritized bidding response, which
minimizes the energy consumption, the detection delay, and
the complexity and overhead associated with cooperative
schemes. Some initial analysis and results for our proposed
auctioning strategy were presented in our previous work in
[11] for the downlink transmission scenario. In this paper,
we extend our previous analysis in [11] by adding a formal
proof for the truthfulness property of our proposed auctioning
mechanism for the downlink, and by addressing the uplink
transmission scenario.
In the literature, many papers have addressed various as-
pects related to the cooperative sensing for CR networks,
for example, maximizing CR network throughput ([19], [20]),
proposing novel fusion and combining rules ([12], [21]), and
proposing algorithms for wideband sensing ([20], [22]). In
addition, there are a few papers discussing coalition formation
mechanisms ([5], [23], [24], [25]), which are also our focus
in this paper. For example, [5] analyzes coalition benefits and
proposes a merge-split algorithm for a more efficient coalition
performance, i.e., better cooperative detection probabilities
with reasonable cooperative false alarm probabilities. This
work is extended in [23], which further takes into account
some other key factors in spectrum sharing and access con-
trol (e.g., interference coordination, capacity optimization and
sensing time). The authors in [24] address the CR admission,
resource allocation and load balancing under IEEE 802.22
framework, by building an optimal coalition structure to
obtain the maximal sum of utilities for all the cells and then
negotiating to reach an optimal payoff distribution with an
objective of maximizing the average payoff for each CR. In
[25], SUs form M coalitions to sense M channels to obtain
optimal sensing accuracy and energy efficiency.
None of these works explicitly consider SUs’ incentives to
cooperate given that participation in a cooperative sensing will
consume SUs’ energy. For example, the paper [5] assumes that
all the users have a mutual interest in sensing the spectrum,
which may not always be the case, especially for a lightly-
loaded network scenario. Users who do not have data waiting
for transmission in their buffers may not be interested in
sensing spectrum in order to save their energy. The assumption
in our work is that SUs are currently passive users, which
need to be incentivized to participate in cooperative sensing
coalitions. To incentivize these SUs’ cooperation we propose
a virtual currency exchange for coalition formation. Our work
differs from all previous works in the literature, in that we
do not implicitly assume that SUs are willing to cooperate
for spectrum sensing if they do not have packets to send,
but rather we incentivize their cooperation by proposing an
auction-based coalition formation mechanism.
This paper is organized as follows. The system model and
assumptions are given in Section II, and our proposed auction-
based cooperative sensing protocol is presented in Section
III. Section IV provides detailed description for the proposed
prioritized bid access control. Simulation results together
with discussions are given in Section V, and conclusions are
presented in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a CR network sharing a known
spectrum with a primary network. The primary network has
a base station (e.g., cellular systems [26], TV broadcast
networks [27]), whose location is known by the CR network,
and multiple users, which are uniformly distributed across the
network. In addition, this primary network has a requirement
on the detection probability of the CR network in order to
guarantee that its QoS will not be degraded due to allowing
opportunistic access for SUs. The access paradigm of SUs
is the interweave mode, defined in [28] as a mode in which
SUs are only allowed to access spectrum holes where PUs
are absent. The CR network consists of several transmitter
(Tx)-receiver (Rx) pairs, which are also uniformly distributed
across the network. We assume that Tx SUs have transmission
buffers to store data from the upper layer. Once the spectrum
is available to these Tx SUs, they will retrieve their data from
these buffers to transmit it over the air. Moreover, we assume
that SUs know their own locations by means of employing
some localization algorithms or based on GPS information.
Our study focuses on stationary SUs and thus no SU mobility
is assumed.
We consider the downlink case first, for which the base
station transmits signals to communicate with its receivers.
We then extend our work to the uplink case. We show
that the auction mechanism can be applied to incentivize
cooperation for the uplink case as well, even though the
utility functions need to be redefined appropriately in order
to capture some new characteristics, which are specific to the
uplink scenario. For the uplink case, there may be one or
more PUs transmitting signals to the base station and their
locations cannot be known by the CR network in advance.
As a consequence, we need to formulate this sensing problem
from the PU receiver’s perspective. The goal is to minimize
the possible interference created by SUs to the PU receiver,
i.e., the base station.
In our system model, we use SUs’ local detection prob-
abilities and the error probabilities for the reporting links
to formulate utility functions. These metrics depend on the
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) for the links, which is a fun-
damental measure for link quality, readily available without
incurring any additional cost to the system. We consider a
densely deployed CR network with a light traffic load. A
dedicated control channel is assumed to be available for SUs
communications for coordination ([17], [20], [29]), which can
be implemented as a dedicated frequency band, an unlicensed
band such as ISM, or an underlay UWB system [30]. For
analysis simplicity, we assume that this dedicated channel is
error free.
A. Detection model
Consider the same detection model as in [5], i.e., energy
detectors for SUs and several SUs forming a cooperative
group/coalition with a SU in this group acting as the head
node. All the SUs in a cooperative group, including the head
SU, perform energy detection and then the member SUs report
their local hard decisions to the head SU via transmission
links employing BPSK modulation. The head SU determines
whether there is a PU present in its neighborhood by using the
OR rule. For readers’ convenience, we give here the detection
probability (pd,i) and the false alarm probability (pf,i) for SU
i using an energy detector in a Rayleigh fading environment
(cf. [31]).
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where θ is the time bandwidth product, λ is the energy
detection threshold and γ¯i,PU = PPUhi,PUσ2 is the average SNR
of the received signal over the link from the PU to the ith SU
i given that PPU is the PU’s transmission power, σ2 is the
Gaussian noise variance and hi,PU = ϕdνi,PU is the path loss
between the PU and the ith SU, where ϕ is the path loss
constant, ν is the path loss exponent and di,PU is the distance
between the PU and the ith SU. Γ(·, ·) is the incomplete
gamma function and Γ(·) is the gamma function. The missed
detection probability of the ith SU is pmd,i = 1 − pd,i.
The energy detection threshold λ is determined based on an
imposed false alarm probability pf .
The cooperative detection probability and the cooperative
false alarm probability for a cooperative group (G) using the
OR rule are given as follows. In this cooperative group, we
consider that the kth SU is the head node and all the other
SUs report to it, and we compute the detection probability
(Pd,G) and the false alarm probability (Pf,G) for the group to
be:
Pd,G = 1−
∏
i∈G
[pd,i · pe,i,k + (1− pd,i) (1− pe,i,k)] , (3)
Pf,G = 1−
∏
i∈G
[pf · pe,i,k + (1− pf) (1− pe,i,k)] , (4)
pe,i,k =
1
2
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1 + γ¯i,k
)
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where pe,i,k is the probability of errors due to fading over
the reporting channel between the ith SU and the kth SU,
and γ¯i,k is the average SNR of the reporting channel between
the ith SU and the kth SU. The cooperative missed detection
probability for this group is given as Pmd,G = 1− Pd,G. The
head SU is the reporting sink, so its reporting error probability
is set to be zero in (3) and (4), i.e., pe,i,k = 0. We note that
using cooperation, the detection probability is improved, but
the false alarm probability is also increased. Therefore, we
need to guarantee that the false alarm probability is kept within
a desirable range by appropriately selecting the cooperative
group members.
B. Frame structure
The energy detector is widely used for cooperative spectrum
sensing due to its simple implementation and no prior informa-
tion requirement on the PU’s signals. The energy detector has
the disadvantage of not being able to distinguish between the
SUs’ and PUs’ signals, and thus SUs using energy detectors
cannot sense the spectrum and transmit data at the same time.
In this paper, SUs are assumed to be perfectly synchronized
at the initial setup of the network.
In our proposed auction-based cooperative sensing, a frame
consists of a cooperative sensing sub-frame and a data trans-
mission sub-frame. In this paper, we assume constant preset
sizes for the sub frames. In the cooperative sensing sub-
frame, all the nodes participating in the cooperative group
sense the channel and report their measurements to the head
node. The head node determines the possible presence of
PU transmissions, by exploiting the OR rule, and if no PU
transmissions are detected, the head node transmits its data in
the data transmission sub-frame.
III. AUCTION-BASED COOPERATIVE SENSING
A cooperative sensing mechanism relies on users participat-
ing in sensing and reporting for improved detection accuracy.
However, sensing will deplete the batteries for the cooperating
users. The work in [5] considers that all the SUs have packets
to transmit and thus form a coalition to help sense the spectrum
and coordinate their transmissions, which is not always a
practical assumption. Our assumption is that SUs do not
always have packets to transmit and must be provided with
incentives to enable cooperation.
A. Virtual currency in an auction-based game
In our model, the CR network is lightly loaded, and conse-
quently there are many SUs in the neighborhood that are not
interested in transmitting packets at the moment. We designate
such SUs in the rest of the paper as idle SUs in contrast to
active SUs which have data to transmit. To incentivize idle
SUs to cooperate, we introduce a virtual currency that can
be used to reward spectrum sensing cooperation. Each SU is
assigned an initial level of currency. Idle SUs can accumulate
currency by participating in cooperative sensing. Once these
SUs become active (i.e., have packets to send), they can spend
their currency on initiating a sensing coalition which would
improve their spectrum sensing detection performance.
Based on this virtual currency, SUs can initiate coalition
requests, and form sensing coalitions based on a bid algorithm
reminiscent of auctions. We propose a three dimensional
modified Vickrey auction mechanism for spectrum sensing
coalition formation, and we show that this auction mechanism
preserves the desirable truthfulness property of the classic
Vickrey auction [32]. A Vickrey auction is a type of sealed-bid
auction, where bidders do not know the bid of other bidders
and the highest bidder wins, but the winner pays the price of
the second-highest bid.
For our problem, an active head SU seeks to find a set of
idle SUs that maximizes its cooperative detection probability
while keeping its cooperative false alarm probability below
some desirable threshold. In this auction-based game, the
head SU rewards the idle SUs for their sensing capabilities
in increasing its own detection probability. However, the head
SU is interested in paying as little currency as possible for the
sensing service provided by other idle SUs. An idle SU aims
at gaining currency but without spending too much energy in
sensing. As a consequence, it will decide to participate if the
currency benefits can compensate its loss in sensing energy.
These benefits and costs for cooperation are captured in utility
function definitions for both the active head SUs and the idle
SUs. These utility functions are used to characterize the users’
payoffs.
B. Utility functions
A utility function is a mathematical way of describing
the payoff associated with an action, reflecting the tradeoff
between the action’s profit and cost. The players in an auc-
tion game (potential cooperative SUs and SUs initiating the
cooperation requests) will choose actions that will maximize
their individual utilities. Based on their utilities, the potential
cooperative SUs decide whether to respond to cooperation
requests and the head SU that initializes the cooperation
request chooses a group of responding SUs.
1) Downlink case: For downlink transmission scenario, we
define the utility for a head SU (uDWh ) as a tradeoff among
the detection probability, the false alarm probability [5], as
well as the virtual currency cost for setting up the coalition:
uDWh = Pd,G −B(Pf,G)−
nm∑
i=1
bi, (6)
where Pd,G and Pf,G are the cooperative detection probability
and the cooperative false alarm probability, respectively, bi is
the price asked by responding/member SU i, (the minimum
payment that responding SUs would accept), and nm is the
number of member nodes in the considered group G. The
B(Pf,G) function is a logarithmic barrier penalty function
given as:
B(Pf,G) =
{
−α2 · ln
(
1− (
Pf,G
α )
2
)
, if Pf,G < α
+∞, if Pf,G ≥ α
,
(7)
where α = Pf,th is the false alarm constraint for the
cooperative group. The formation of coalitions that incur an
undesirably high false alarm probability (i.e., Pf,G > Pf,th)
is prevented by imposing an infinite cost for such coalitions.
We simplify the expression in (6) to reduce the overhead
on payment information exchange and reduce implementation
complexity [33] by proposing a more generous payment policy
in which all the member SUs are equally paid with rm,
which is defined as the maximum of all the prices asked
by member SUs in the current cooperative group (G), i.e.,
rm = maxi∈G bi. Hence, the utility for the head SU is
simplified as,
uDWh = Pd,G −B(Pf,G)− nmrm. (8)
Given the utility function in (8), the head SU will select a
winning cooperative group among all possible groups of SUs.
The winning group will have the best detection performance
(in terms of the tradeoff between detection probability and
false alarm probability) obtained with the lowest payment. The
utility um,i of an arbitrary member SU i, is defined as the
amount of currency it gets after cooperating in the spectrum
sensing, i.e. the difference between the bid and the energy cost
for cooperation. Formally:
um,i =
{
bi − Ce,m, if bi − Ce,m > 0
−∞, if bi − Ce,m ≤ 0
, (9)
where Ce,m = ǫ · ce,m is the energy cost for cooperation
assuming a price ǫ per unit energy and an energy expenditure
ce,m. We assume a uniform energy expenditure for cooperation
across all the member nodes and thus Ce,m is the same for
all the members. This utility definition represents a member
SU’s effective gain when it chooses to cooperate, namely the
difference between its received payment and its energy cost.
If its received payment is less than its energy cost, the SU
will get a negative infinite utility, which will discourage its
cooperation. The definition of the utility function ensures that
only the SUs that can get enough payment to compensate their
loss in energy due to cooperation will respond to cooperation
requests.
2) Uplink case: Compared to the downlink case, it is much
more difficult to derive detection probabilities for SUs’ energy
detectors for the uplink transmission scenario. This is due to
the fact that more than one PU may be transmitting data to
the base station at the same time. These PUs are randomly
distributed over the field, and if there is no prior knowledge
about the primary network deployment and the PUs’ locations,
an exact derivation of a cooperative detection probability is
intractable. As a consequence, the utility function associated
with a head node (i.e., the node requesting the coalition for-
mation) needs to be redefined to capture the relevant measures
of performance for the uplink case. In our work, we assume
that the base station is located at the field’s center and the
PUs’ locations have a uniform distribution. In our design, we
exploit the knowledge on the location of the base station, and
the uniform distribution of SUs, by seeking coalition partners
with more advantageous positions to detect PUs, i.e., closer
to PUs’ receiver. In addition, we also consider the link quality
for the reporting nodes when computing the utility function
for a head node.
Taking into account a similar simplified payment strategy
as for the downlink case, a head SU’s utility for the uplink
case (uUPh,k ) can be defined as what a head SU can obtain after
subtracting all the payments from the group’s detection gain.
uUPh,k = min
i∈G
(
di,BS
1− pe,i,k
) ·
1 + nm∑
i∈G
di,BS
1−pe,i,k
−B(Pf,G)−nmrm,
(10)
where di,BS is the distance between SU i and the base station,
pe,i,k is the error probability of the link between SU i and
the head SU k and 1 + nm is the total number of SUs in
the cooperative group G including the head SU. The gain
is considered to be invert proportional to an average loss
∑
i∈G
di,BS
1−pe,i,k
1+nm
, where larger distances to the base station and a
bigger error rate of reporting links are more disadvantageous
for PU detection. The term mini∈G ( di,BS1−pe,i,k ) is introduced for
normalization purposes. From this definition, we can see that
a smaller average distance from the group to the base station
and a more reliable reporting link are preferred. The member
SUs’ utility function for the uplink case remains the same as
the one proposed for the downlink case, i.e., (9).
C. Modified Vickrey auction mechanism
In a traditional Vickrey auction, the bidder with the highest
bid wins and pays the second highest bid. For our cooperative
sensing scenario, the head SU selects its coalition members
such that such coalition membership maximizes its utility
function. The coalition members form a winning group de-
noted as Gw. Since the head SU’s utility is a combination
of performance and price (as defined in (8)), the bid price
alone cannot be used to determine the winner. Furthermore,
multiple winners for this auction game are possible. It becomes
clear that the classic Vickrey auction mechanism needs to
be modified in order to accommodate these new constraints
[34], but the requirement is to preserve its desirable truth-
fulness characteristic. In what follows, we take the downlink
transmission scenario as an example to illustrate and analyze
our proposed auction mechanism. We note that discussions
and proof hold for the uplink case as well, with the only
modification that the head SU’s utility function definition is
different for the uplink transmission case.
In our proposed auction mechanism, the head SU selects
auction winners based on its utility, and determines a payment
strategy that will preserve the truthfulness characteristic of
the Vickrey auction. We propose a new payment scheme
(ρm), which represents the highest price in the winning group,
plus the difference between the utility (umax = Pd,Gw −
B(Pf,Gw )− nmrm) for the best coalition Gw and the utility
(u′max = P ′d,G′ − B(P ′f,G′) − n′mr′m) for the second best
coalition G′, divided by the number of members in the winning
group Gw, i.e.,
ρm = max
i∈Gw
bi +
umax − u
′
max
nm
≡ max
i∈Gw
bi + x, (11)
with x = umax−u
′
max
nm
> 0. In the expressions of umax
and u′max, nm and n′m are the number of members of
coalitions Gw and G′, respectively, and rm and r′m are the
payment (maxi∈Gw bi) for the coalition Gw and the payment
(maxi∈G′ bi) for the coalition G′, respectively. Note that
rm = maxi∈Gw bi, so the payment expression is simplified
as
ρm =
[Pd,G −B(Pf,G)]− u
′
max
nm
. (12)
1) Truthfulness property: The following theorem illustrates
that the proposed auction mechanism has the desirable truth-
fulness property.
Theorem 1. Truthfulness property The above proposed pay-
ment mechanism for our modified Vickrey auction ensures
that all users have a dominant strategy of bidding their true
valuation of resources.
The motivation behind our proposed payment mechanism
is that the actual payment should be unrelated to an SU’s
own bid, but should benefit this SU in Gw. In (11), a higher
payment than the winning SU’s own bid benefits this SU
because x > 0, and the benefit is equally distributed among
all the SU members. From (12), we can see that the actual
payment does not depend on the SUs’ individual bids. This
property holds for all the cases except when the highest bidder
is also the highest bidder for the second highest utility group.
To avoid having a key node (i.e, a node that is advantageously
placed and thus most likely to be part of multiple candidate
coalition groups) drive the bid price for multiple coalitions,
and thus have incentives to overbid, the head node will modify
the auction as follows. In the case that the highest bidder in the
winning coalition is also the highest bidder in the runner up
coalition, the second highest utility will be computed based on
a price computed using the second highest bid in the coalition,
thus effectively discounting the highest bidder. This change
ensures that coalitions with the highest and second highest
utility will not have a common bid price in this particular
situation, and thus the proof of truthful bid will hold for all
cases. The detailed proof steps for the theorem are given as
follows for a general case, when we assume that the highest
bidder in the winning coalition is not the same as the highest
bidder in the runner up coalition.
Proof: We note that a SU cannot change the winning
decision unless it has the highest bid in the winning group.
Suppose that SU j who has the highest bid in its group
decides to bid higher than its true valuation: bj + y, y > 0. In
this case, the user will remain the highest bidder in its group.
Given this scenario, there are two possible cases:
(a) The group that SU j is involved in loses this auction,
which results in um,j = 0. If the group would have
won this auction by SU j bidding bj , then this SU’s
utility would have been um,j = bj + x − Ce,m > 0.
So overbidding decreases its utility. If bidding the true
valuation would not have won this auction, then still
um,j = 0, which implies that there is no incentive for
the user to overbid.
(b) The group that SU j is involved in wins this auction,
which implies that SU j would also have won with a
bid bj , because a lower bid yields to a higher utility
for the requesting SU. The SU j gets paid bj + y + x′
with x′ = [Pd,G−B(Pf,G)−nm(bj+y)]−u
′
max
nm
= x−y given
other SUs are bidding their true valuation. Therefore, the
actual payment is bj + x, which is the same as what is
paid when this SU bids truthfully.
Suppose that SU j decides to bid lower than its true
valuation: bj − y. No matter whether this SU is still the
highest bidding in a group or not, it both means the highest
bid decreases and the same discussion applies. Without loss
of generality, for illustration purposes, we consider the case
in which this SU still has the highest bid. Similar to the
overbidding case, there are also two cases:
(a) The group that SU j is involved in loses this auction,
which implies that SU j would also lose with a truthful
bid bj . Therefore, the lower bid does not change the
outcome of this auction. In other words, this SU does
not have an incentive to underbid its true valuation.
(b) The group that SU j is involved in wins this auc-
tion. If this SU’s action has changed the outcome of
this auction by underbidding, then this SU gets paid
bj − y + x
′
, where x′ can be determined as x′ =
[Pd,G−B(Pf,G)−nm(bj−y)]−u
′
max
nm
= y−x. Then the actual
payment for this SU is bj − x < bj , where bj is the
minimal price this SU would accept to be paid for its
energy expenditure. If this SU would also have won
without lowering its bid, the payment that this SU gets
when underbidding is decreased to bj − x from bj + x
when bidding truthfully, because this SU has the highest
bid in this group. Therefore, this SU does not have an
incentive to underbid its true valuation.
By defining the actual payment ρm (which is greater than
the initial payment rm) when selecting coalition members, the
head node’s final utility decreases. However, we show that the
effective utility of a head node is positive, which ensures that
the head node will have an incentive to initiate the cooperation.
The head node’s effective utility is defined as
uh = Pd,G −B (Pf,G)− nm
(
[Pd,G −B(Pf,G)]− u
′
max
nm
)
= u′max > 0.
(13)
2) Bidding: We propose a three-dimensional bid structure,
Bi = (pd,i, pe,i,k, bi) for the downlink case and Bi =
(di,BS , pe,i,k, bi) for the uplink case, where pd,i is the local
detection probability of node i, di,BS is the distance between
node i and the base station, node k is the requesting node,
pe,i,k is the error probability over the link between node
i and node k, and bi is the price asked by node i. This
three-dimensional bid mechanism will allow the auctioneer
to evaluate its gains in terms of the detection probability that
a new cooperating user may bring to the coalition, as well as
costs associated with both false alarm probabilities and virtual
payments.
The detection probability and the error probability can
be calculated using (1) and (5), respectively, given the
known/estimated power and distance information. The bid
price asked by SU i is defined as a function of its resid-
ual energy and its current virtual currency balance. In our
simulations, we consider that the SUs have a given energy
reserve and then this energy is gradually depleted without
replenishment. Since SUs value energy, their cooperative price
should increase when they have a small residual energy reserve
and sufficient currency. The SUs’ utility function captures
the fact that their energy valuation is modulated by their
current residual battery energy levels and their virtual currency
balance (a “rich SU” would be less interested in accumulating
more currency). Based on these observations, we propose a
virtual currency bid (bi) defined as follows:
bi = β
ci
ξr,i
, (14)
where β is a scale parameter, ci is the currency balance of SU
i and ξr,i is its residual energy.
IV. PRIORITIZED ACCESS FOR BIDDING
As a consequence of a node initiating a cooperation request,
multiple response bids may collide on the common shared ded-
icated channel in our densely populated CR network. Based
on our assumption of a lightly loaded network, we anticipate
very few collisions in initiating requests for cooperation and
substantial collisions for bid responses.
As such, for requesting SUs, a simple binary exponential
backoff scheme for collision resolution is employed. In an
exponential backoff scheme, the retransmission after collisions
is delayed by an amount of time derived from the slot time and
the number of attempts to retransmit. In a binary exponential
backoff scheme, a random number of slot times between 0
and 2z − 1 is chosen after z collisions.
For the responding SUs, we propose a prioritized backoff
access scheme in order to reduce the probability of collisions,
to improve the delay in establishing coalitions, and to better
prioritize the order of responses for various SUs.
Coordination sub−frame 
RRA RRA Data TransmissionCooperative Sensing
One Frame 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the modified frame structure for coordination.
In what follows, we discuss the implementation aspects of
our proposed cooperative sensing scheme. Firstly, we describe
the proposed frame structure. Secondly, we define a priority
level for the backoff response access for bidders, and finally,
the detailed coordination procedure is described.
A. Modified frame structure
We have introduced the regular frame structure for coop-
erative sensing in Section II-B. This frame holds when all
SUs have data to transmit and thus have a clear incentive in
participating in cooperative sensing. In the context of lightly
loaded networks, only SUs being selected by our auction game
are participating in the cooperative sensing stage. Thus, our
modified frame structure starts with a coordination sub-frame
as depicted in Figure 2.
A coordination sub-frame is comprised of several Request-
Respond-Acknowledge (RRA) phases, which are further di-
vided into a request sub-phase, a response sub-phase and
an acknowledgement sub-phase. The sub-phases consist of
several slots. The number of RRA phases and numbers of slots
in these sub-phases are implementation-dependent parameters
which can be designed in order to optimize the performance
of CR networks taking into account the SUs’ distribution and
network traffic characteristics.
In the request sub-phase, SUs who need to, and are able
to ask for cooperation send their cooperation requests. In
the following response sub-phase, SUs that hear a request
and are interested to cooperate respond to the request with
their bids. The requesting/head SU then selects SUs to form
its cooperative sensing group/coalition in order to maximize
its utility. In the acknowledgement sub-phase, the requesting
SU pays the selected responding SUs and thus confirms the
formation of a cooperative group.
During one coordination sub-frame, there is at most one
successful request in the neighborhood, but in the entire
network, there could be multiple successful requests as long
as they are separated in space, such as not to interfere with
each other. Winners in the coordination sub-frame will send
their data in the data transmission sub-frame and we are
assuming that a frame cannot be multiplexed by multiple
users, so only one SU can win in the neighborhood, while
in the large network, geographically distant SUs may transmit
their signals at the same time. After the coordination sub-
frame, a cooperative sensing sub-frame follows, in which
the formed cooperative sensing group will collaboratively
sense the spectrum to determine its availability. Finally, the
data transmission sub-frame follows, in which the successful
head SU will transmit its data if the sensing result from the
cooperative sensing sub-frame is the absence of PUs.
B. Priority level
For the prioritized access, we define a priority level for
responding SUs according to their bids, i.e., their local de-
tection probabilities for the downlink case and the distances
between them and the base station for the uplink case, the
error probabilities for their reporting links and their bid prices.
Assume without loss of generality that SU k is a requesting
SU (head node). Then, the priority level for a bidding SU i
in the downlink case (lDWi,k ) is defined as
lDWi,k = w1
pd,i
pe,i,k
+ w2 (−bi) ,where w1 + w2 = 1, (15)
where pd,i is the local detection probability of SU i, pe,i,k is
the error probability of the reporting link between SU i and
SU k, bi is the asked price by SU i, w1 and w2 are weights
associated with the ratio of pd,i to pe,i,k, and bi respectively.
We note that a high local detection probability, a good quality
of the reporting link and a low price are preferred in terms
of the requesting SU’s utility. The priority level for a bidding
SU i in the uplink case (lUPi,k ) is defined as
lUPi,k = w1
dk,BS
di,BS · pe,i,k
+ w2 (−bi) ,where w1 + w2 = 1,
(16)
where dk,BS is the distance between the head SU k and the
base station and di,BS is the distance between the responding
SU i and the base station. It is noted that the responding SUs
that have smaller distances to the base station are given a
higher priority.
The responding SUs’ backoff windows are set according to
their priority levels. More specifically, a responding SU i with
a priority level lDWi,k or lUPi,k (denoted as li in the following)
will set its backoff window between t and t+2L/ log(li), where
t is the starting time of the response sub-phase and L is used
to scale the priority level and to guarantee the randomness.
The impact of the parameter L selection on the performance
of the proposed prioritized access algorithm will be discussed
in Section V.
We note that the prioritized response statistically ensures
that good bids are received first and thus allows the requesting
SU to collect only the first N responses rather than to
collect all the responses, without significantly degrading the
performance. Further, the complexity of the winners’ selection
algorithm also decreases with the decrease in the number
of received bids, as the head SU needs to consider all the
possible combinations when determining the winning group
that achieves a maximum utility.
C. Coordination procedure
In Fig. 3, we illustrate a flow chart for the prioritized access
control for downlink coalition formation. At the beginning,
SUs calculate their local detection probabilities when they
have data to send. If their local detection probabilities are
greater than a threshold pd,r (i.e., they have a good channel
condition), they will perform individual sensing, otherwise,
they will request cooperative sensing. The threshold pd,r can
be determined according to the network QoS requirement. The
difference between the downlink case and the uplink case is
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Fig. 3. Flow chart of the coordination procedure.
that, in the uplink scenario, SUs compare their distances to the
base station with a threshold dup,r in order to decide whether
to initiate a cooperation process or not, rather than compare
their local detection probabilities with the threshold pd,r. For
illustration purposes we present here the flow chart for the
downlink case (Fig. 3).
At the beginning of a request sub-phase, if a SU has a non-
empty queue, it will send a request packet if it has not heard
any successful request in the previous request sub-phases in
the current frame. If the SU has heard that a successful request
has taken place in a previous RRA phase, it will defer its
request to the next frame since only one SU can send its
data in the current frame. If requests of several SUs collide
in the same request sub-phase, the requesting SUs will not
receive any response in the following response sub-phase and
then they will reschedule their requests in another request
sub-phase possibly in the same frame using again the binary
exponential backoff scheme.
In the response sub-phase, the SUs who hear a request and
are interested in participating in the sensing coalition will
respond to the requesting SU with their bids by using a random
backoff access with a backoff window modulated by their
priority levels as described in Section IV-B. More specifically,
a responding SU first calculates its backoff window according
to its priority level, then it uniformly selects one slot within
this window to respond with its bid. Colliding SUs abandon
competition for the current RRA phase. The winners are
selected by the head node, among all the successful received
bids in this phase. In the acknowledge sub-phase, the head SU
acknowledges the winners by broadcasting their payment.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulations in this paper are implemented in Matlab.
We consider 32 nodes deployed in a square region of 3km-
by-3km with a fixed base station at the center. The path
loss exponent is chosen to be 3. For both downlink and
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR THE COOPERATIVE SENSING PROTOCOL
Notation Value Description
Ptx,PU 100mW Transmission power of the base station;
Ptx,SU 10mW Transmission power of SUs;
ν 3 Path loss exponent;
pf 0.01 SUs’ local false alarm probability used
to determine the local detection thresh-
old;
Pf,th 0.1 Constraint on false alarm probability
for the cooperative group;
pd,r 0.9 Detection probability threshold for the
downlink case;
dup,r 500 Distance threshold for the uplink case;
ǫ 0.1 Price of a unit energy;
ce,m 0.01 Member SUs’ energy expenditure per
cooperative sensing;
ce,h 0.02 Head SUs’ energy expenditure per co-
operative sensing;
β 0.01 Scaling parameter for SUs’ bids;
w1 0.1 Weight of the ratio of pd,i to pe,i,k in
the priority level;
w2 0.9 Weight of bid bi in the priority level;
L 10,5 Scaling parameter for SUs’ backoff
window;
δ 4 Death rate of PU’s birth-death process;
µ 1.5 Birth rate of PU’s birth-death process;
η 0.5 SUs’ packet arrival rate;
uplink, PUs’ transmission power is set to be 100mW and
SUs’ transmission power is 10mW. For the downlink case,
the target false alarm probability is set to be 0.01 for the local
energy detector, based on which a threshold for detection is
determined. A threshold for the detection probability, set to
be pd,r = 0.9, is used by SUs to determine whether or not to
ask for cooperation. For the uplink case, a threshold for the
distance from SUs to the base station is set to be 500 meters
and SUs located farther will seek their neighbors’ cooperation.
All the SUs are assigned one unit initial energy and one unit
initial currency. In our simulation, for illustration purposes,
we exploit a simple model for SUs’ energy depletion: every
member SU consumes the same amount of energy (ce,m),
while the head SU consumes twice as much energy as member
SUs (ce,h). In this section, we use the convention that a group
with x members has actually x+ 1 total nodes, including the
head SU. All the parameters are summarized in Table I, and all
the presented simulation results were obtained by averaging
over 100 runs.
A. PU and SU activity models
We use the same PU and SU activity models for both
downlink and uplink. To model the PU activity, we use a
two-state birth-death process with a death rate δ and a birth
rate µ as in [17], [29]. We also assume that the duration of
the ON state and the OFF state are exponentially distributed
([17]) with the parameters δ and µ, respectively. We chose the
death rate δ = 4 and the birth rate µ = 1.5 for the numerical
results. For the SU activity, we model SUs’ data arrival as
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Fig. 4. A snapshot of the cooperative group formation. Illustration for the
downlink case.
a Poisson process with an expected number of arrivals per
frame, η = 0.5.
B. Coordination analysis based on one snapshot simulation
From the perspective of cooperative group formation, there
is no difference between the downlink case and the uplink
case, because the algorithm that facilitates group is indepen-
dent of the utility function definition. We use the downlink
transmission scenario to illustrate our simulation results.
Fig. 4 represents a snapshot of the cooperative group forma-
tion in our CR network at the end of an arbitrary coordination
sub-frame. In Fig. 4, we represent the PU base station as a
blue star, a successful requesting SU as a solid black triangle
with its member SUs represented by a solid green square,
and an idle SU who does not join in the cooperative sensing
is represented as a circle. The red dashed circle explicitly
illustrates a cooperative group. We note that there are only
18 SUs totally shown in the figure, rather than the entire
group of 32 SUs deployed in the network, because the other
14 SUs are located near the base station and as such, will
perform individual sensing due to their good channel quality
and they are thus out of our scope for our task of illustrating
the cooperative mechanism.
At the beginning of the request sub-phase in the first
RRA sub-phase of an arbitrary chosen frame, SU4, SU9,
SU10, SU11, SU14, SU18 nodes have initiated requests for
cooperation, but SU9 and SU10 collided because they are in
the transmission range of each other. So according to the
exponential backoff scheme, SU9 rescheduled its request to
the fourth request sub-phase in the current frame, and SU10
would request again in the second request sub-phase of the
current frame. The successful nodes, SU4 and SU11 cannot
form cooperative groups because they do not have neighbors.
SU14 would like to select its only neighbor SU5 to form its
cooperative group, but SU14 cannot afford the payment to SU5
at this time, so no coalition is formed. SU18 selected SU15 and
SU17 as its members from all the successful responding SUs
(SU3, SU6, SU7, SU15, SU17) in order to obtain maximal
utility. The responses from SU8 and SU12 collided, so they
lost the opportunity of being selected as members. In the
second RRA phase, SU10 requested successfully this time and
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT RESPONSE SCHEMES.
Case I Case II Case III
Pmd,G 0.0071 0.0084 0.0119
Pf,G 0.0369 0.0395 0.0345
Complexity 6.4 4.7 2.0
Window Length 6.4 67.8 8.8
selected SU13 to form its cooperative group. When it came to
the fourth RRA phase, SU9 defers its request because SU10
has succeeded in the previous RRA phase.
C. Performance analysis of prioritized response
In order to understand tradeoffs among different perfor-
mance measures achieved by introducing the prioritized re-
sponse access, we consider the following three cases. In
the description, we denote the qualified neighbors as the
neighboring nodes with positive utilities, not members of
another cooperative group and not currently waiting to initiate
cooperation requests.
• Case I: Perfect response access.
This scenario represents an ideal case that involves no
collisions, and can be implemented by perfectly schedul-
ing all the responses to a cooperation request.
• Case II: Complete prioritized response access.
For this scenario, all the qualified neighbors perform
prioritized backoff first. Some responding neighbors may
collide, but all the good responses are collected. In this
case, some responses may not reach the requesting SU
due to collisions and the time that the requesting SU
needs to wait in order to collect all the responses may be
long.
• Case III: Truncated prioritized response access.
The requesting SU only collects the first N responses, or
only waits for a fixed period of time in the response sub-
phase. This case is proposed to overcome the possibly
undesirable long response sub-phase, at the cost of pos-
sibly degraded detection performance. For the numerical
results illustration, the head SU collects the first two
responses.
In our simulation, we illustrate in Table II the average
cooperative missed detection probability (Pmd,G), the average
cooperative false alarm probability (Pf,G), an estimate of the
average computational complexity and the average window
length of the response sub-phase for the downlink case over
different SU layouts. In Table II, the computational complexity
of the algorithm is estimated as the average number of success-
ful responses, which is related to the number of combinations
that need to be computed and compared by the head SU to
maximize its utility (the head SU computes the power set of
all the successful responding members, which is the set of all
the possible subsets of these successful members).
We can see that the detection performance deteriorates in
Case II and Case III compared to Case I, while the false alarm
probabilities are kept within the same range. Furthermore, we
see that the processing complexity for the head SU decreases
significantly especially for Case III. When we calculate the
number of combinations that the head SU needs to compare
based on the number of received responses, the improvement
becomes even more significant. For example, if the head SU
receives 5 responses, it needs to compare 31 combinations; if
the head SU receives 2 responses, it only needs to compare
3 combinations, which is a strong decrease in complexity
compared to 31 combinations. In Case I, the number of suc-
cessful response is equal to the number of qualified neighbors,
while in Case II some neighbors’ responses are not received
by the head SU due to collisions. So the head SU receives
fewer responses in Case II than in Case I. As expected, Case
II has the longest response window. Again, in Case I, the
neighbors’ responses are coordinated perfectly and the length
of the responding window is equal to the number of neighbors.
In practice, Case III is more attractive, due to its simple
implementation, short response window length and acceptable
detection performance. The performance degradation is not
significant because the prioritized access response will ensure
that, statistically, the best bids will be received first.
From the energy consumption and coordination delay per-
spective, our proposed prioritized bidding response in con-
junction with a proper truncation scheme can help achieve the
minimal energy cost and detection time. A smaller number
of responses means that SUs will spend less energy in signal
transmission and processing and the system will have shorter
frames, which corresponds to a smaller detection delay. Con-
sidering Case III in Table II as an example, when there are two
successful responses, other SUs will quit from transmission
and a large reduction of the number of combinations a head SU
needs to consider also saves its additional energy. Moreover,
the response sub-phase length in Case III is only around 13%
of that for Case II. Considering that a coordination sub-frame
may consist of several RRA phases, we can expect more
improvement on the detection time.
D. Cooperative detection performance
As we have previously discussed in Section III-B2, for the
uplink case we assume that the responding/member SUs that
are closer to the base station are more beneficial for a head
SU to get a higher utility. In Fig. 5, we show the cooperative
groups’ missed detection probabilities with respect to their
average distances to the base station. We note the increasing
trend of the curve which shows a tendency for the missed
detection probability to increase with distances of reporting
nodes to the base station, although the fading characteristic of
the channel will affect this increasing trend, thus resulting in
some fluctuations of the missed detection probability.
In our simulations we illustrate that the missed detec-
tion probability can be decreased if coalitions of nodes are
formed based on our proposed auction-based mechanism,
while keeping the false alarm probability within a desirable
range and maximizing the system lifetime. In this subsection
we focus on illustrating the missed detection and false alarm
probability performance. In Fig. 6 and 7, we show how
the missed detection probability can be reduced compared
to the individual sensing for different head nodes, which
form small coalitions (two members), for the downlink and
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nodes in a cooperative coalition to the base station for the uplink case.
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Fig. 6. Downlink cooperative detection performance.
uplink cases, respectively. For the uplink case, only one PU is
considered, which corresponds to the worst case for the energy
detectors (i.e., no accumulated signal strength from multiple
PUs received by SUs).
From both Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we see that the detection
performance is improved significantly when cooperation is
incentivized between the head SU and its two member SUs.
Without cooperation, the individual detection performance is
below the acceptable level. We also note that the cooperative
false alarm probability is kept within a desirable range. We
can see that the detection performance for the uplink case is
worse than that for the downlink case, and this is an expected
result, as the uplink case is more difficult to analyze due to
the lack of information on the nodes’ exact locations, and thus
relies on some model approximations.
In Fig. 8, we show the cooperative sensing performance
in terms of the average missed detection probability and the
average false alarm probability when the coalition has one, two
and three members. The individual/non-cooperative sensing
performance is represented by a zero-member coalition. We
can see that the detection performance is improved when
the SUs cooperate, increasing as the number of members
increases. The improvement in the detection performance
comes at the price of a higher false alarm probability. We
can see that, by including the false alarm probability in the
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Fig. 7. Uplink cooperative detection performance.
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Fig. 8. Downlink/Uplink cooperative detection performance with respect to
the size of coalitions.
utility function definition, the proposed auction scheme limits
the increase in the obtained false alarm probability for the
coalition within desirable levels.
E. Residual energy distribution
A balanced energy expenditure is beneficial for achieving a
longer network lifetime. If some SUs drain their energy much
faster than others, their short lifetime would affect the network
connectivity and topology, thus disabling the CR network. In
Fig. 9, we show the variance of the residual energy across all
the SUs in the network as it evolves in time, starting from
the initial first frame to the last frame for which all the SUs
are functional, i.e., they are not energy depleted. We noticed
that the residual energy variance increases very slowly , with
a measured maximum variance of about 0.04 for the downlink
case and about 0.035 for the uplink case, which means that our
proposed mechanism yields an even battery life distribution
and thus maximizes the network lifetime.
F. Discussion on parameter selection
In our proposed prioritized response access, we introduce
the weights w1 and w2 in the definition of the priority level
(see (15)), and the scale factor L to determine idle SUs’
backoff window in Section IV-B. Selecting the ratio of w1
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TABLE III
PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT PARAMETER COMBINATIONS
(w1,w2,L) A:(0.1,0.9,10) B:(0.1,0.9,5) C:(0.5,0.5,10)
Pmd,G 0.0084 0.0194 0.0170
Window Length 67.8 6.7 6.2
to w2 will determine whether the detection performance or
the currency is more important and how much one metric
is preferred over the other one. The factor L controls the
backoff window length and implicitly influences the collision
probability of the bidding responses. A larger L yields a
longer response sub-phase, while a smaller L results in more
collisions. Note that all of these parameters jointly affect
the backoff window. Therefore, the network designer should
determine w1 and w2 first according to his preference, and
then L should be selected considering the tradeoff between the
length of the response sub-phase and the collision probability.
Table III gives the cooperative missed detection probability
and the backoff window length for various values for the
parameters mentioned above. We see that the detection per-
formance is degraded due to collisions of responses in Case
B (smaller L), compared with that in Case A, although a
smaller backoff window is achieved in Case B. In Case C, the
change of weights has a similar effect on the missed detection
probability and the response window length to a smaller L.
These parameters could be optimized with respect to various
performance metrics, and this will be addressed in future work.
There are two other parameters defined for our proposed
cooperative sensing, ǫ (price of unit energy) and β (scale
factor in SUs’ bidding), which are not set to adjust the
system performance. The price of unit energy ǫ should be
set according to the energy evaluation in the network and the
scale factor β is used to balance the energy consumption, the
currency and the detection performance (see (14) and (15)).
The virtual currency plays a critical role in our auction-
based mechanism. In a practical scenario, SUs are given
an initial level of currency, which allows them to initiate
cooperation and to interact with their neighbors in the auction
game with the purpose of not depleting their currency. This
initial level of currency can be experimentally determined
based on the characteristics of the secondary network. As
the network is functioning, some SUs may not be able to
afford their members’ payments in a frame, and then they need
several frames to become able to form coalitions again, either
by earning currency after they respond to their neighbors’
requests, or by selecting different sets of member nodes, who
bid with lower prices.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel cooperative sensing
framework for cognitive radio networks, which incentivizes
selfish SUs to cooperate by introducing a virtual currency
reward in an auction game. In this game, the SUs are guar-
anteed to bid their true valuation. A prioritized access control
framework for the bid responses is also proposed to reduce
the amount of collisions incurred, the sensing coalition set-up
time, and the complexity of the bid selection algorithm. Our
numerical results show that our cooperative sensing scheme
improves the detection performance, while keeping the false
alarm probability below an acceptable threshold. Future work
will address some other aspects of parameter optimization for
our design. In addition, an interesting extension to our current
mechanism would be to integrate some schemes to mitigate
the negative impact of malicious users.
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